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E-ISSUES TAKE CENTER STAGE:
THE 2000 SAG/AFTRA STRIKE
CRAIG J. ACKERMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of technologi-
cal innovation on labor relations in the entertainment industry.
Traditionally, the introduction of new media - movies, television,
cable, VCRs and satellites - has created conflict between manage-
ment and labor over compensation and working conditions.1 Ac-
cording to some industry spokespersons, "the rapid pace of
technological change is the single most important influence on la-
bor relations and is at the root of most labor-management disputes
in the [entertainment] industry."2 The unions seem to concur in
this assessment. For example, an official of the Screen Actors Guild
("SAG") has opined that, "all of the major strikes of the talent un-
ions have been 'technology driven."' 3
Like its technological predecessors, the Internet is a divisive
labor relations issue because of its potential, based on the introduc-
tion of increasingly sophisticated streaming video and compression
technology, to displace the use of older media such as television
and, thereby, bypass established frameworks for payment of residu-
als to commercial actors and erode the jurisdiction of SAG and the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA").
Generally speaking, the industry pays actors and actresses who work
on commercials "minimum scale" with residual compensation
* J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1997; L.L.M., Associate, Labor and
Employment Group, Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 1997-2000; L.L.M. Candidate in La-
bor and Employment Law, New York University School of Law, 2000-01. The au-
thor wishes to express his gratitude to Day Krolik, Adjunct Professor of Law at New
York University and Vice President of Talent Negotiations and Labor Relations at
NBC, for his insightful comments to an earlier draft of this paper. It is important
to emphasize, however, that the views presented herein are exclusively those of the
author.
1. See UNDER THE STARS: ESSAY ON LABOR RELATIONS IN ARTS AND ENTERTAIN-
MENT 46, (Lois Gray & Ronald Seeber eds., 1996) [hereinafter UNDER THE STARS].
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 46.
(293)
1
Ackermann: E-Issues Take Center Stage: The 2000 SAG/AFTRA Strike
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
294 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
amounting to as much as four times the initial session fees.4 As a
result, "commercials are the largest source of residual income for
actors." 5 In particular, commercials generate approximately $700
million annually for union members.6 Anecdotal evidence con-
firms that commercials are the "mainstay" of most actors and ac-
tresses. 7 Consequently, both SAG and AFTRA have been highly
motivated to seek jurisdiction over, and residual compensation for,
the playing of commercials on any new media such as the Internet.
The motivation was not only to prevent erosion of traditional
residuals from the displacement of old media by new media, but
also to capture additional residuals for any supplemental play of
commercials in the new media format.
This paper will analyze the recently settled SAG/AFTRA strike
and the significant impact of the Internet on SAG/AFTRA's dispute
with advertisers. Part B discusses the bargaining history of the par-
ties and key non-Internet issues. Part C analyzes Internet issues and
the argument that the imminent arrival of e-TV was the most impor-
tant factor in the negotiations. Part D discusses the parties' settle-
ment agreement and the compromises made by both sides. As the
terms of the new collective bargaining agreement suggest, SAG/
AFTRA was willing to sacrifice key demands on cable residuals in
order to establish ajurisdictional foothold in the Internet world. In
this regard, SAG/AFTRA may be the first of a number of entertain-
ment unions willing to make hefty compromises in order to facili-
tate the seizure of jurisdiction in cyberspace. Finally, Part E
presents tentative conclusions about the nature of technological
change and collective bargaining drawn from the experience of the
2000 SAG/AFTRA strike.
4. See Allen Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the Transforma-
tion of Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industries: Talent Sector,
47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. (1994) (quoted in UNDER THE STARS, supra note 1 at
171).
5. UNDER THE STARS, supra note 1 at 170.
6. See Roger Armbrust, SAG-AFTRA Calls Spot-Pact Strike, Back Stage 1, Vol. 41,
Iss. 16, 2000 WL 19738877, Apr. 21, 2000 (stating "[t]he lucrative commercials
contract has brought the two unions' members nearly $700 million annually"); see
also American Association of Advertising Agencies, ANA/AAAAJoint Policy Committee
on Broadcast Talent Union Relations' Strike Alert, at http://www.aaaa.org/downloads/
negotiationsOO/strike/6-26.html (stating "[i]n 1999, the SAG/AFTRA talent pay-
roll for television and radio commercials was $708,500,000").
7. See Bill Dunlap, Striking a Chord, SHOOT 21, Vol. 41, Iss. 20, 2000 WL
18256540, May 19, 2000 (quoting Susan Boyd, President of AFTRA, Los Angeles
local: "We do movies, we do TV, industrials and so forth, but commercials have
always been the mainstay.").
[Vol. 8: p. 293
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II. THE LONGEST STRIKE IN HOLLYWOOD'S HISTORY: GENERAL
BACKGROUND TO THE SAG/AFTRA DISPUTE
On October 12, 2000, the SAG/AFTRA strike against the com-
mercial advertisers became the longest strike in Hollywood history,
surpassing the 154-day Writers' Guild Strike that took place in
1988.8 When the parties finally announced the settlement of their
dispute on October 22, 2000, it was the SAG/AFTRA strike's 175th
day.9
This section sets forth the bargaining history between SAG/
AFTRA, the Joint Policy Committee ('JPC") of the Association of
National Advertisers ("ANA") and the American Association of Ad-
vertising Agencies ("4A"), which led to the extended strike. Specifi-
cally, this section analyzes the parties' respective positions with
respect to non-Internet issues such as rates of pay for television
residuals, cable pay-per-play and monitoring of residual payments
for accuracy. As shown below, the bargaining positions of the ad-
vertisers and the unions were heavily influenced by the trend in
viewership rates from network television to cable and the parties'
prior negotiations (or lack thereof) with respect to cable residuals.
This analysis is pertinent to the discussion of the Internet, not only
because the parties' negotiations with respect to cable impacted
their negotiating strategies with respect to the Internet, but also be-
cause Internet issues are intertwined in complex ways with the more
traditional subjects of negotiation.
A. Summary of Bargaining History Between SAG/AFTRA and
the JPC: Why Couldn't the Parties Just Get Along?
The SAG/AFTRA strike arose in the context of a negotiation
over the renewal of an industry-wide collective bargaining agree-
ment between SAG/AFTRA and the JPC of the 4A that was sched-
uled to expire by its own terms on March 31, 2000.10 Commercial
negotiations began on February 14, 2000;11 on that date, four major
issues were on the agenda: (1) rates of residuals for network televi-
8. SeeJohn Herzfeld, SAG/AFTRA, Advisors Break Off Talks, Missing Chance to
End Five-Month Strike, 190 DLR A-10 (Sept. 29, 2000).
9. SeeJohn Herzfeld, Negotiators Reach Tentative Settlement in SAG/AFTRA Strike
Against Advertisers, 206 DLR AA-1 (Oct. 24, 2000).
10. See Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA 2000 Television Commercial Contract
Proposal Summaries, at http://www.sag.org/strike/strikenews.html (noting SAG's
chronology of events relating to strike); see also American Association of Advertis-
ing Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/index.html
(noting 4A's chronology of events relating to strike).
11. See Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA 2000 Television Commercial Contract
Proposal Summaries, at http://www.sag.org/strike/strikenews.html; American Asso-
295
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sion commercials; (2) cable pay-per-play; (3) monitoring of residu-
als for accuracy; and (4) the Internet.12
The parties quickly reached impasse over the main subjects of
the negotiations. According to SAG/AFTRA representatives, nego-
tiators for the JPC refused to discuss pay-per-play for cable orjuris-
dictional issues relating to the Internet unless SAG/AFTRA agreed
to change the general framework of residuals for network television
commercials from pay-per-play to a flat fee. As SAG's Gordon
Drake explained, "[t]heir negotiators won't address cable or the
other issues until we accept the Class A rollback. We'll never accept
it.' ' 1 3 For SAG/AFTRA, the retention of the existing residuals
framework was a strikable issue, as were the other key topics on the
agenda. Accordingly, on March 28, 2000, SAG/AFTRA voted to
give its board authority to call a strike if necessary. Of the 135,763
SAG and AFTRA members nationwide, 40,956 members cast votes
and 93% of those returning ballots voted to authorize the strike.14
In early April 2000, SAG/AFTRA made the following proposals
in negotiations with the JPC: (1) Cable: SAG/AFTRA proposed ex-
tension of the pay-per-play formula from network television to
cable; (2) Internet: SAG/AFTRA proposed (a) that the current tele-
vision and radio commercials agreement be expanded to include
commercials made for the Internet and (b) that a use measurement
residual system be adopted for the Internet; (3) Monitoring: SAG/
AFTRA proposed a fund to establish a monitoring system for com-
mercial usage on network, cable and the Internet; (4) Television:
SAG/AFTRA proposed a 14% across the board wage increase in all
other areas, except for Spanish language (25% increase) and for-
eign use payments (125% increase); and (5) Benefits: SAG/AFTRA
proposed an additional 1% of all talent payments to be paid to the
ciation of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotia-
tions00/index.html (noting 4A's chronology of events relating to strike).
12. See Roger Armbrust, SAG Strike Head: It's Internet, Stupid, BACK STAGE 1,
Vol. 41, Iss. 29, 2000 WL 24046683,July 21, 2000 (quoting Gordon Drake: "There
are four major issues in the talks: rollbacks, cable pay-per-play, monitoring and the
Internet."); see also David Mason, Three Unions Vote Next Summer, NATIONAL POST,
2000 WL 26898712, Sept. 21, 2000 (Arts & Leisure) ("AFRA and SAG have been
on strike against the advertising industry since May 1 because of a dispute over
residual payments for commercials on cable, the rate of payment on broadcast TV,
and payments for ads rebroadcast on the Internet.").
13. Armbrust, supra note 12 (noting Drake told national board of directors
that guild would never agree to one-time buyout on network spots).
14. See Screen Actors Guild, at http://www.sag.org/pressreleases/pr-
la000328.html (stating "SAG/AFTRA Commercials Contract Strike Authorization
Receives 93% Approval").
[Vol. 8: p. 293
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pension and health funds which would increase the existing 12.65%
contribution to 13.65%.15
On April 14, 2000, the JPC made its "final offer" to SAG/AF-
TRA, which consisted of the following proposals: (1) Session pay-
ments: the industry proposed an increase in daily session payments
of 4.4% from $478.70 to $500; (2) Extra Performer Rate: the indus-
try proposed an increase in daily payments of 6.2% from $259 to
$275; (3) Network-Flat Payment Guarantee: the industry proposed
changing the existing "pay per use" network residual payment
(which contained no guarantee) to a flat guaranteed payment of
$2,575 for unlimited use of commercials during a standard thir-
teen-week period; (4) Cable Residuals: the industry proposed a
60% increase in the maximum cable residual payment from $1,014
to $1,627 for unlimited use during a thirteen-week period; (5)
Spanish Program Commercials: the industry proposed an increase
of 7.2% for Spanish program commercials from $1,399 to $15,000;
(6) The Internet: the industry proposed that for television and ra-
dio commercials transitioned or "moved over" for Internet use, the
existing rate of two session fees be incorporated into the commer-
cials contract. The industry further proposed to meet and confer
over commercials made exclusively for the Internet until jurisdic-
tional issues are resolved; and (7) Monitoring: the industry pro-
posed the formation of a special industry/union committee to
study the conversion of the existing residual payroll and reporting
system to one that pays and reports residuals based on verification
of use, for example, media invoices and station reports.' 6
Because the JPC's "final offer" fell significantly short of SAG/
AFTRA's wish list and arguably constituted a "roll-back" of pay-per-
play residuals for network television, SAG/AFTRA rejected these
proposals outright and elected to strike. Accordingly, on April 19,
2000, SAG/AFTRA mailed out a Strike Notice to members, which
defined the key issues as follows: (1) Pay per play for cable; (2)
monitoring of commercials for accuracy in payment of residuals;
(3) Internet broadcast of commercials (both jurisdiction over com-
mercials made for initial use on the Internet and residuals for tele-
vision commercials used on the Internet and/or e-commercials
15. See Screen Actors Guild, SAG Commercials Contract 2000, at http://
www.sag.org/contract2000/strikenotice.html (noting official bulletin of SAG/AF-
TRA strike notice).
16. See Press Release, AAA/AAAA Joint Policy Committee on Talent Union Rela-
tions, (Apr. 19, 2000), American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://
www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/status4-19.html (regarding status
of SAG/AFrRA negotiations).
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made for use on the Internet); and (4) the industry's expressed
desire to eliminate Broadcast Network Class A pay-per-play formula
and instead pay a flat fee of $2,575 for unlimited use in a thirteen-
week cycle. 17
B. Analysis of Key Non-Internet Issues: "If They're Watching
Cable, We Can't Pay" vs. "Let's Try and Catch The
Long Departed Boat."
As shown below, the advertisers' proposals in the SAG/AFTRA
negotiations were motivated primarily by a shift in viewership from
network television to cable. The unions' positions, on the other
hand, were heavily influenced by SAG/AFTrRA's prior failure to
capitalize fully on the trend toward cable in terms of negotiation of
a residual formula. The background history is critical to under-
standing the parties' respective positions with respect to the In-
ternet, which appears to be the first post-cable technological trend
with significant long-term consequences for labor relations in the
advertising industry.
1. Residuals for Network Television Commercials: Rollback or Bankroll?
At the commencement of the SAG/AFTRA negotiations, the
JPC proposed a replacement of the pay-per-play residual structure
for network television commercials with a guaranteed flat fee:
Currently for commercials which air on the networks
(ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, WB, UPN and PAX), performers
are paid residuals on a [pay-per-play] formula. The new
proposal restructures that current formula and replaces it
with a flat rate of $2,045.05 (on-camera) for an unlimited
number of Class A uses in a [thirteen] week period. This
proposal eradicates the unions' long standing [pay-per-
play] residual structure for this type of use.18
The JPC attempted to justify this change in payment structure with
two distinct lines of argument. First, the JPC asserted that, given
certain industry trends - specifically, the lower ratings on network
17. See Screen Actors Guild, SAG Commercials Contract 2000, at http://
www.sag.org/contract2000/strike-notice.html (setting forth SAG/AFTRA strike
notice).
18. See http://www.sag.org/contract2000/proposal (noting that under indus-
try's proposal, actors and actresses were guaranteed $500 when they performed in
commercial; if commercial played on broadcast television, $500 fee was to be ap-
plied against total $2,575 flat fee).
[Vol. 8: p. 293
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versus cable television - the pay-per-play system was no longer fi-
nancially viable:
The industry explained prior to negotiations that the pay-
per-play methodology designed in the 1950's for commer-
cials run on the "Big 3" networks, which then delivered
over 90% of the American television audience, is outmo-
ded given the change in viewership, the demise of network
dominance, and the proliferation of cable and network
viewing options. These fundamental changes require ad-
vertisers to play television commercials many more times
than in the past to reach the same viewership. A pay per
play system in today's TV market is unjustifiably costly.19
The basic argument advanced here is that if the American public is
watching cable more frequently now, then the old payment model
does not suffice. Stated differently, advertisers must now run com-
mercials more times on the networks to reach the same total num-
ber of viewers. 20  Under a pay-per-play model, SAG/AFTRA
members benefit from this "windfall" of additional play even
though the clients and the industry presumably secure no more
"benefit" from the supplemental airing of commercials because the
audience size remains the same. 21
The JPC's second argument in defense of its proposal to eradi-
cate pay per play on network television was that their guaranteed
flat fee proposal would benefit more actors and actresses than the
current pay-per-play method:
The industry firmly believes that its proposed guaranteed
residual methodology in which a principal actor will be
paid a guaranteed residual payment of over $4,200 for one
day of work filming a commercial aired on network and
cable during its initial cycle of use, more for spot use and
19. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.
aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/status4-19.html.
20. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.
aaaa.org/downloads/negotiations00/strike/6-26.html ("The Association of Na-
tional Advertisers conducted an industry study and analysis of these trends in 1998-
99 prior to the commencement of the current SAG/AFTRA negotiations. The
goals and analysis of this study were four-fold: (1) Bring the methodology under
which talent is compensated current with present trends in viewership of TV adver-
tising, (2) eliminate windfall payments born out of an industry structure which no
longer exists.").
21. See id. (arguing that repeat commercials to same size audience have
"value" to industry irrespective of diminished viewer size; in theory, additional play
to same/smaller audience should operate to increase sales of any product).
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more in subsequent cycles will benefit well the vast major-
ity of SAG members. Under the old [pay-per-play]
residual formula, pay was based on a gamble that a com-
mercial would play many, many times. In fact, 50% of all
actors made less than $2,045 in network residuals per cy-
cle. Trading a gamble for a guarantee is the only prudent
way to provide economic stability to scale actors. It is truly
a "win win" way of modernizing the contract for effective
use in the year 2000 and beyond. 22
To promote this argument, attorneys and officials representing the
industry during the SAG/AFTRA strike reiterated time and again
that under the prior collective bargaining agreement, 50% of all
actors and actresses made less under the pay-per-play structure than
they would under the industry's proposed flat fee system.23
These arguments were not very persuasive to the unions' nego-
tiators. SAG/AFTRA maintained that the industry's logic was un-
tenable in light of its recent record profits.24 Because advertising
revenues were allegedly up, the JPC had a difficult time persuading
SAG/AFTRA to alter the established pay-per-play formula for net-
work television residuals. Significantly, SAG/AFTRA also pointed
out that, notwithstanding the network's diminished percentage of
the total viewing audience, "the total number of television viewers
has grown by 66% in the last thirty years." 25
The JPC's second argument that the proposed flat fee would
benefit most actors and actresses arguably proved too much. From
a financial standpoint, if this argument were true, why would the
industry support this framework? The crux of SAG/AFTRA's re-
22. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://
www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/6-6.html.
23. See, e.g., American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://
www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/6-12.html (stating that "half of
all scale actors received pay per play network residuals under the expired contract
of less than $2,045 per cycle, plus a maximum cable residual of $1,014 per cycle,
for a total of $3,059, or less"); see also American Association of Advertising Agen-
cies, at http://www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/6-26.html (noting
industry's new residual guarantee of $4,202 per quarter of use in network and
cable constitutes at least 37% increase per quarter for half of SAG members, and
benefits vast majority of SAG/AFTRA members).
24. See Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA Commercials Strike 2000 Commercial
Strike Information, at http://www.sag.org/strike/faq.html (stating "[a ] dvertising
revenues are up dramatically. According to Advertising Age, total gross income for
the top 500 U.S. based ad agencies increased by over 22% in 1999. Additionally,
an accounting by Cable Television Advertising Bureau revealed a 33% gain in
cable billings up to $10 billion").
25. Id. (arguing network is just as powerful today as it ever was).
[Vol. 8: p. 293
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joinder was that, with more play of commercials on network televi-
sion, last year's residual payment figures would not be an accurate
indication of anticipated figures for the coming years. That is, 50%
more actors and actresses over the next decade will likely do better
under the established pay-per-play scheme than under the com-
pany's proposed flat-rate scheme due to additional play of network
television commercials. Thus, while the industry's proposal was
perhaps unfairly characterized as a "rollback" when viewed against
last year's residuals for SAG/AFTRA members, it could be so con-
strued when viewed against current projections of future residual
payments.
Needless to say, SAG/AFTRA took the position that pay-per-
play would benefit the vast majority of actors and actresses. The
following question and answer were found on the SAG/AFTRA
Commercials Strike 2000 Website:
Q. I understand the Industry is offering $2,575 per net-
work cycle (on-camera principal) whether the com-
mercial runs once or a hundred times. Isn't that a
good deal if the commercial runs only a few times?
A. No, not at all. The Industry admits that the average
network commercial runs [forty-two] times or more
during a thirteen-week cycle. The current contract
pays $3,025 for [forty-two] runs, $5,730 for [one hun-
dred] runs. Further, one of the commercial actor's
greatest and most perplexing problems is overexpo-
sure. The more your commercial runs, the less likely
you are to get another commercial any time soon. It is
vital - and only fair - that performers be paid ade-
quately for each run in order to help compensate for
this effect.2 6
Without access to the underlying financial information, it would be
difficult to deliver judgment on the authenticity of each side's
claims. However, assuming for the sake of argument that new tech-
nologies such as the Internet operate to supplement, rather than to
replace, existing network television commercials, SAG/AFTRA
members may be sitting on the network television residual
equivalent of a gold mine. Suffice it to say that SAG/AFTRA was
clearly convinced that its members would be better served by the
26. Screen Actors Guild, at http://www.sag.org/strike/faq.html (demonstrat-
ing union's answer is not actually an implicit yes, and that industry's flat fee may be
superior for commercials that run significantly less than 42 times).
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pay-per-play formula in both the network television and cable
arenas.
Although not explicitly admitting that SAG/AFTRA's argu-
ments on the network residuals issue were meritorious, the JPC im-
plicitly did so through its subsequent negotiating reversals. On
September 13, 2000, the parties returned to the negotiating table in
New York City at the request of federal mediators.27 On September
27, 2000, after three days of pre-negotiation mediation and nine
days of face-to-face negotiations with full negotiating committees,
discussions broke down without an agreement.2 8 Significantly, how-
ever, theJPC agreed during these marathon negotiations to rescind
its proposal to change the structure of residual payments for net-
work television commercials:
In a major effort to settle the longest strike in SAG's his-
tory, the industry removed prior proposals that the union
had been characterizing as "roll-backs." The industry had
proposed a guaranteed residual formula as the center-
piece of its attempt to modernize the contract. The indus-
try proposed this as a way to more accurately reflect the
contemporary television advertising market in which net-
work viewership has declined and cable viewership has
risen. We consider dropping the network proposal to be a
major concession to the unions' number one articulated
concern. This, as well as our offer of lucrative increase in
cable residuals, should have settled the strike. Nonethe-
less, the unions have continued to negotiate from a posi-
tion that they require capitulation to all of their other
demands.29
The most interesting aspect of this press release is the way in which
the advertisers portrayed their decision to relinquish their demand
to change the structure of residual payments on network television
as a major concession to SAG/AFTRA. Apparently, one group's
"windfall" is another group's bargained for benefit. From the posi-
tion of SAG/AFTRA, this alleged "concession" is nothing more
than a promise to maintain the status quo prior to the commence-
ment of the negotiations, hardly a dramatic "concession," except
when viewed against unexpected changes in viewership.
27. See Herzfeld, supra note 8.
28. See id.
29. American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/status9-28.html
[Vol. 8: p. 293
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The JPC portrayal of its decision to change its position on tele-
vision residuals as well as the complete reversal of its position on
the necessity to alter network television's pay-per-play formula sug-
gests that the industry may have used the threat of a network
residual "rollback" as a bargaining chip with which to make a "ma-
jor concession." Arguably, the JPC gave away nothing by agreeing
to maintain the status quo ante. On the other hand, given current
viewership trends, the industry could argue in good faith that it
made a real concession, which required some reciprocation by
SAG/AFTRA prior to, or in connection with, any substantive discus-
sion on cable and/or Internet-related issues.
2. Cable Pay-Per-Play: SAG's Attempt at Come From Behind Bargaining
The second major issue in the SAG/AFTRA dispute with the
JPC concerned the unions' demand for a new pay-per-play formula
for cable television residuals. In the negotiations, SAG/AFTRA at-
tempted to remedy its past bargaining mistake of agreeing to a flat
fee for unlimited use of cable commercials in a thirteen-week cycle
by proposing a radical new residual formula for cable. Needless to
say, the parties were initially unable to agree on a solution to the
cable residual issue.
There is a generally held view in the entertainment industry
that SAG/AFTRA "missed the boat" in prior negotiations over
residuals for commercials aired on cable. Some objective evidence
supports this view. Payment of cable residuals under the collective
bargaining agreement operative in the early part of 2000 were
capped at $1,014 for unlimited use during a thirteen-week cycle. 30
Apparently recognizing that this flat fee does not adequately com-
pensate actors and actresses, the JPC proposed an increase in the
cap of 60% to $1,627 for unlimited use during a thirteen-week
cycle. 31
Based on tremendous increases in cable viewership, SAG/AF-
TRA proposed a pay-per-play system for cable residuals:
Members have been concerned over the inequities in
cable residuals paid to performers over the past several
years. The union proposal establishes a [pay-per-use]
residual formula which is similar in concept to the existing
Class A program residual structure. The unions are pro-
30. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://
www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsO/strike/4-19.html.
31. See id.
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posing that the "per use" fee is tied to a 37% factor of the
corresponding Class A use paid to the performer.32
According to theJPC, SAG/AFTRA's proposed formula would have
produced a "350% increase in the annual cable residual payments"
and cost the industry $650 million more in cable payments alone
over three years.33 Before the strike, the parties were able to make
limited progress on the cable residual issue. For their part, the un-
ions reduced their demands and insisted on increases of cable
residuals by only 150% during the new contract. The advertisers, in
turn, proposed increases of 85%.34
It seems reasonably clear that the unions were engaged in
"come from behind" bargaining with respect to the issue of cable
residuals. That is, SAG/AFTRA attempted to recapture monies
their members would have received had the unions negotiated a
pay-per-play regime for cable residuals into the prior contract. Un-
surprisingly, the advertisers were unwilling to revisit the flat-fee sys-
tem in part, based on the parties existing practice. The cable pay-
per-play issue emphasizes the importance of prophecy in the bar-
gaining process. If only SAG/AFTRA had anticipated viewership
shifts to cable, they could have negotiated far stronger formulas for
cable residuals on behalf of their members. As evidenced by the
final settlement terms of the 2000 strike, SAG/AFTRA did not want
to make the same mistake with respect to the Internet.
3. Monitoring of Residuals for Accuracy
The third major issue in the SAG/AFTRA negotiations, the
monitoring of commercials for accuracy in the payment of residu-
als, is relevant in the network television, cable and Internet con-
texts. At first glance, this issue appears to be one in which the
parties early in their discussions should have been able to find some
common ground. After all, neither side could deny the proposition
that actors and actresses should be paid the residuals owed them
under formulas negotiated through the collective bargaining pro-
cess, whatever final shape those formulas assume. Nevertheless, as
discussed more fully below, the parties were initially unable to make
32. Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA 2000 Television Commercials Contract Pro-
posal Summaries, at http://www.sag.org/contract2000/proposal-sag-explain.html
(summarizing more equitable cable residual structure).
33. American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/4-19.html; see also http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/6-24.html.
34. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://
www.aaaa.org/downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/6-24.html.
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significant progress on this issue, and the issue remains open and
subject to further study under the terms of the recent strike
settlement.
At the commencement of negotiations, SAG/AFTRA de-
manded independent verification that its actors and actresses were
being paid appropriate amounts of residuals: "The unions demand
that the industry agree and pay for an unspecified method from
which a third party may be able to institute a monitoring system to
track the playing of all commercials on network and cable."3 5 In
April 2000, the JPC counter-proposed the "formation of a special
industry/union committee to study converting the present residual
payroll and reporting system to one that pays and reports residuals
based on verification of use, for example, media invoices and sta-
tion reports. '3 6 After these initial discussions, no serious progress
was made toward a bargained resolution of this relatively non-ideo-
logical issue until September or October 2000, when the parties es-
sentially agreed to study the issue further.3 7
One reason for the stale-mate may be the fact that SAG/AF-
TRA implicitly accused the industry of dishonesty with respect to
payment of current residuals. Specifically, Gordon Drake stated
that SAG/AFTRA's own ad hoc investigations demonstrated that ac-
tors and actresses are often underpaid their accrued residuals:
"Every time we've taken a group of commercials and studied them,
we've found underpayment [for actors]. It's always fallen in favor
of the advertisers. We've never owed them money. They've always
owed us."3 8 This statement implies the impossibility of anything but
intentional and systematic underpayment by its use of the terms,
"every time," "always" and "never." These allegations may have ossi-
fied the advertisers' position on this issue, by focusing on the indus-
try's honesty and integrity.
A second stumbling block to a resolution of the monitoring
issue may have been SAG/AFTRA's insistence that the industry
bear the full cost of the monitoring regime. On its Commercials
Strike 2000 Website, SAG/AFTRA did not deny that their proposal
was expensive, but took the position that dramatic underpayments
of residuals justified the expense of the effort:
35. American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/negotiationsOO/strike/9-28.html.
36. American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/negotiationsO0/strike/4-19.html.
37. SeeJohn Hersfeld, Negotiators Reach Tentative Settlement in SAG/AFTRA Strike
Against Advertisers, 206 DLR AA-1 (Oct. 24, 2000).
38. Armbrust, supra note 12.
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Q. Is monitoring the use and frequency of commercials
even possible? Doesn't the industry claim it will cost a
fortune?
A. Yes, it is possible; yes, the industry does claim it will cost
a fortune. But SAG has run a few tests to check the
accuracy of commercial payments. Checking only 36
commercials, we collected more than $100,000 in un-
derpayments! Obviously, some of that "fortune" be-
longs to us. Even more important, actors deserve to
have the assurance that they are being paid accurately.
Systems and technology do exist that can dramatically
improve accuracy and, with some cooperation from the
industry, those systems can be expanded to cover the
majority of commercial use. Now is the time to get that
cooperation. 39
Here, SAG/AFTRA avoided any discussion of the JPC's central con-
cern of how to pay for the monitoring. To resolve this issue, SAG/
ALFTRA needed to demonstrate that a monitoring system could be
implemented without great expense or else suggest some creative
financing solutions. Because the former proposition appears un-
tenable, the parties will have to study the latter.
One possible solution might be a cost-sharing arrangement. If
SAG/AFTRA is confident in its assessment of widespread underpay-
ment of residuals, it may be sensible to finance part of the cost of
the monitoring regime. SAG/AFTRA could contribute its share of
the expense via a deduction of a percentage from the recovery of
any additional residuals secured for actors and actresses through
additional monitoring. In the long-run, as I further suggest below,
the Internet itself may be the most cost-effective tool for monitor-
ing payments of residuals.
III. Is THE TV SKY FALLING?: WHY E-TV WAS THE KEY ISSUE IN
THE SAG/AFTRA DISPUTE
Although each of the issues previously discussed is important
in its own right, the Internet was arguably the single most sensitive
and explosive issue in the SAG/AFTRA negotiations with the JPC.
As shown further below, the imminent convergence of cable and
the Internet will very likely have the effect of conflating all of the
39. Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA Commercials Strike 2000, Commercials
Strike Information, Know the Facts!, at http://www.sag.org//strike/faq.html. (last vis-
ited 8/28/01).
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critical issues discussed during the course of the SAG/AFTRA nego-
tiations. Moreover, as both parties to the negotiations may already
intuit, the Internet is a technological tsunami that has the long
term potential to weaken significantly entertainment companies
and unions unwilling to adapt to the new technology. For these
reasons, the prospect of online television was probably the core issue
in the 2000 SAG/AFTRA strike.
According to senior officials in SAG and AFTRA, the JPC ini-
tially did not want to discuss the Internet issue because the advertis-
ers already recognized in early 2000 that a significant part of the
future of television commercials is on-line. Based on this theory,
Gordon Drake, SAG's national strike captain, accused the advertis-
ers of using "rollbacks on network residuals" as a "smokescreen" to
avoid negotiations on the unions' Internet jurisdiction proposal.40
According to Drake, who supplements his acting income by work-
ing as a web consultant for Internet companies, television and the
Internet will soon merge so that "prime time is near, in Internet
time." 41 This convergence theme was emphasized on SAG/AF-
TRA's Commercials Strike 2000 Website:
Most industry insiders believe the Internet will converge
with cable television to become the primary medium for
entertainment and information delivery to the home in
the next few years. However, the industry has refused to
recognize SAG and AFTRA as having any jurisdiction to
cover performers' work directly for the Internet. Subse-
quently, the industry has refused to discuss it at the negoti-
ating table. It is one of the key issues about which we are
striking. Without that jurisdiction, the Internet will be-
come a haven for non-union, underpaid work. Just as
cable became vital to television, the Internet will probably
become crucial to our future. We must not let the future
become unprotected and non-union. 42
Stated otherwise, SAG was concerned that increased use of the In-
ternet by advertisers would erode their muscle by reducing their
jurisdiction to "old economy/old technology" advertisements. The
40. Roger Armbrust, Tiger's Spot Lands Him in a SAG Trap, BACK STAGE, Aug. 4,
2000, at 47.
41. Armbrust, supra note 12 (quoting Gordon Drake: "The convergence of
TV and the Internet is getting closer and closer; it's upon us, basically.").
42. Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA Commercials Strike 2000, Commercials
Strike Information, Know the Facts!, at http://www.sag.org//strike/faq.html. (last vis-
ited 8/28/01).
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basic message here was that SAG/AFTRA determined that they
needed to unionize cyberspace to maximize their future relevance.
Although unions are sometimes prone to hyperbole in the
midst of a strike, SAG/AFTRA's analysis of the convergence of tele-
vision and the Internet appears to be consistent with the prognosti-
cations of technical experts. 43 Analysts predict that, by 2005, 47
million households will have high-speed Internet connections. 44 By
2009, the number is expected to climb to 107 million households,
equivalent to ninety percent of Internet users.45 New video com-
pression technology, such as "DivX" developed by Microsoft, has
laid the foundation for Internet video to be the next major trend
on-line. 46 As one industry observer recently noted, "Internet and
new media convergence now completely engulfs the entertainment
industry."4 7
The "engulfment" phenomenon has expressed itself in various
ways pertinent to the future of television commercials on-line.
First, nearly every major advertising agency has established a "New
Media" division, the objective of which is to capture part of the $2
billion annual on-line advertising market.48 Second, web and new
media firms are constantly merging "in efforts to take advantage of
changing technology, and in the hopes of offering consumers eve-
rything from film, network and cable TV, and music over the In-
ternet."49 Third, numerous start-up companies are working on
43. See, e.g., Mary Rasenberger & M. Lorraine Ford, Untangling the Web of
Rights to Film and Video: Before Putting Such Content On-Line, Clear it for Use on the
Internet, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at S3 (stating that "[b]roadband access is coming
even faster than anyone thought").
44. See id. (citing Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, The Broadband Report: Reaping
What You Sow: ROI in the Broadband Market, (Summary Report) (May 1, 2000), at 7-
8).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Armbrust, supra note 12.
48. See 98 DLR A-1I (May 19, 2000) (quoting SAG PresidentJohn MacGuire:
"Nearly every major ad agency has now established New Media divisions actively
pursuing how best to utilize the Internet for commercial uses."); see also Edwin
Molina, USA Video Interactive Corp-USA Video and Lightforce Films Sign Internet Con-
tract, CANADA STOCKWATCH, Dec. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 27161735 ("In-
ternet advertising reached $2 billion last year, is headed above that this year and is
growing exponentially.").
49. Armbrust, supra note 12; see also Robert Goldrich, 4MC's Riot, Digital
Magic, POP Merge, SHOOT, Mar. 24, 2000, at 18 (discussing merger of several com-
panies and concluding that, "the newly formed RIOT will be well positioned to
serve the changing landscape in which television and the Internet, as well as adver-
tising and entertainment, are coming together"); Eleftheria Parpis, Breaking
Through, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, July 12, 2000 at S4 (discussing deal between Prop-
aganda Films and Internet aggregate Atomfilms to produce short films for web);
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more advanced video compression software that will facilitate the
airing of commercials on the Internet as if they were running on
network television. 50 Finally, the prospect of e-TV has spawned the
creation of "virtual studios" in Hollywood, armed with state-of-the-
art equipment for the production and distribution of e-TV, virtual
advertising and webcasting. 51
The future of Internet television will likely be impacted more
by the networks and large players in the entertainment industry
than by these early e-entrepreneurs. As an attorney for the industry
has written:
The future of video on the web may not be truly discern-
able until the entertainment industry begins to concen-
trate more of its firepower on finding ways to harness the
new Internet technologies rather than railing against
them - to find methods by which the Internet will capital-
ize, rather than cannibalize, content.52
Although it is still early in the process, one thing is clear to most
observers: "Come the broadband revolution.., video will be ubiq-
uitous [on-line]. ''53
The manifold potential ramifications of the Internet may ex-
plain the JPC's initial unwillingness to discuss the merits of SAG/
AFTRA's assertions of jurisdiction in cyberspace. The advertising
industry initially took the position that it was "premature" to discuss
the issue of SAG/AFTRA's jurisdiction over commercials made for
the Internet:
Molina, supra note 48 (discussing merger aimed at bringing live video content,
including live video advertising, to web).
50. See, e.g., Audiohighway.com's New AmpliFire Network to enable Websites with Rich
Media Content and Online Commercials, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 30, 2000 (discussing Am-
pliFire Entertainment's new modules for delivery of streaming video to Internet
users who download music videos); Kathy DeSalvo, HIS Creates Kayoss, SHOOT, July
14, 2000 (discussing HIS Productions' creation of Kayoss to "produce commercials
and music videos" and "bring them to the Internet"); Alan Fischer, Tuscun Com-
pany's Tiny Disc's Produce Hi-Resolution Video, ARiz. DAILY STAR, July 14, 2000, at DI
(discussing SpecDrom's VideoBlast products which offer high resolution TV com-
mercials sent in real time over the Internet); Richard Gluyas, Go Connect for Scru-
tiny, AusTRALIAN Bus. INTELLIGENCE, Aug. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25863903
(discussing technology of GoConnect and Telestra enabling interactive full motion
Internet video commercials).
51. See Producers Ivan Gulas and Christopher Eberts Form MirageQuest Entertain-
ment, BUSINESS WIRE, June 2, 2000 (discussing new company formed to provide
state of the art studios for web TV, Internet commercials and music video
productions).
52. Rasenberger & Ford, supra note 43, at S22.
53. Id. at S3.
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SAG/AFTRA demands exclusive jurisdiction over com-
mercials made exclusively for the Internet - something
they have never had before. The industry proposed a
"meet and confer" agreement under which the industry
and unions would exchange information while this area
develops during the next three years. The industry states
that Internet advertising is still in its infancy and it is pre-
mature to grant jurisdiction over this presently undefined
area.
54
Nevertheless, SAG/AFTRA continued to assert jurisdiction over
commercials made for the Internet based on the similarity of the
work involved in comparison with television commercials. AFTRA
President, Shelby Scott, summarized her position on management's
refusal to recognize SAG/AFTRA's jurisdiction over the Internet as
follows:
[The] position is totally untenable .... The performers
are the same, the work is the same, the employers are the
same. The only difference is that the industry seeks to
deny these actors the benefits provided by their unions for
all other commercial productions. 55
These arguments were not necessarily persuasive to the industry.
As insiders are well aware, the mere fact of similarity of work does
not imply automatic union jurisdiction. For example, ESPN, CNBC
and MSNBC are all currently non-union despite the fact that the
work performed is equivalent to NBC's unionized, non-cable work.
Still, as the SAG/AFTRA strike settlement demonstrates, the indus-
try was eventually willing to compromise on the issue of Internet
jurisdiction.
IV. THE CENTRALITY OF E-ISSUES TO THE SAG/AFTRA
STRIKE SETTLEMENT
The SAG/AFTRA strike revealed the critical importance of the
Internet as an issue in labor relations in the Internet industry. As
shown in this section, the settlement of the strike indicates that the
unions were willing to make deep concessions in order to secure a
foothold in cyberspace.
54. American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://www.aaaa.org/
downloads/ negotiationsOO/strike/9-28.html.
55. Herzfeld, supra note 8.
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On October 19, 2000, after a three week hiatus, negotiations
were reconvened in New York City by a federal mediator. 56 After
several days of lengthy discussions, on October 23, 2000, SAG/AF-
TRA and the JPC announced a settlement of their dispute and the
basic framework for a new collective bargaining agreement. 57
The basic terms of the final settlement between SAG/AFTRA
and the advertisers were as follows: (1) retention by the advertisers
of the pay for play structure for residuals for network television
commercials; (2) an increase for the unions of up to 100% in the
rate of residuals for commercials running on cable television; (3)
recognition of SAG/AfTRA's jurisdiction over commercials made
for, or used on, the Internet (although such jurisdiction is limited
to the definition of "commercial" set forth in the existing collective
bargaining agreement between the parties); and (4) an agreement
to study jointly for six months the possibility of implementing a
monitoring system for residuals. 58
It is fair to say that, with respect to the issues of cable and net-
work television residuals, the basic pre-existing regime for payment
of residuals persists under the newly-negotiated collective bargain-
ing agreement. Clearly, the JPC did not secure a "roll-back" of the
pay per play system for network television commercials, the mainte-
nance of which had been a "key union goal."59 Conversely, SAG/
AFTRA did not secure its proposed pay-per-play model for cable
television commercials. Thus, "the industry mostly got what it
wanted on the cable front."60 In essence, neither side persuaded
the other to accept a fundamental change in the residual payment
regime for commercials running on established technologies.
Some observers have gone a step further and opined that "the
settlement reached between the union and the advertisers is little
more than a return to the status quo that prevailed before the strike
began." 61 This analysis, however, trivializes major concessions se-
cured by SAG/AFTRA in the Internet arena. Although the advertis-
ers initially refused to recognize, or even discuss, any union
jurisdiction over Internet advertising, they eventually conceded ju-
56. See Herzfeld, supra note 37; see also Wayne Freedman & Richard Linnett,
Six Month Strike is Over, But No Victor is Declared, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 30, 2000, at
3.
57. See Herzfeld, supra note 37; Freedman & Linnett, supra note 56.
58. See Herzfeld, supra note 37; Freedman & Linnett, supra note 56; see also
SAG, AFTRA Members Vote to Ratify Contract with Commercial Advertisers, 234 DLR A-1 0
(Dec. 5, 2000).
59. See Herzfeld, supra note 37.
60. Friedman & Linnett, supra note 56, at 26.
61. Advert Break, THE GuUARDIAN, (London), Oct. 27, 2000, at 11.
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risdiction over certain Internet commercials. The industry recog-
nized SAG/AFTRA's jurisdiction over the Internet because "the
unions were insistent in moving in that direction .... " 62 It should
be emphasized that this was the first time ever that the advertisers
recognized the unions' jurisdiction over commercials made for the
Internet. 63
However, SAG/AFTRA's beachhead in cyberspace came at a
significant cost. First, the unions' jurisdiction is limited to and by
the definition of "commercials" set forth in the existing collective
bargaining agreement. Second, SAG/AFTRA was forced to agree
to a flat rate compensation formula for commercials "moved over"
from television to the Internet.64 Depending on the ease with
which commercials may be "moved over," this loophole may prove
to be an ill-advised concession. SAG/AFTRA apparently believes in
a future world filled with residuals on commercials made exclu-
sively for the Internet, a topic which has been deferred to future
negotiations.6 5 As one commentator observed, "the union won in
terms of getting jurisdiction over Internet ads, while the advertisers
won in terms of limiting the jurisdiction. '66
Only time and the ever-changing trajectory of technological
change will tell whether SAG/AFTRA made intelligent concessions
to secure a jurisdictional foothold in cyberspace. Nevertheless,
these e-arrangements clearly break new ground and do not simply
return the parties to the status quo ante. It seems reasonably clear
that the unions have moved the Internet to center stage of their
overall labor strategy in this sector. Indeed, one could perhaps
have inferred the great level of importance SAG/AFTRA now at-
tach to the Internet from the way in which they effectively used the
Internet to articulate their positions during the strike. 67
62. Friedman & Linnett, supra note 56, at 26 (quoting Dan Jaffe, Executive
Vice President of the ANA).
63. SAG, AFTRA Members Vote to Ratify Contract with Commercial Advertisers, 234
DLR A-10 (Dec. 5, 2000).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See generally, Screen Actors Guild, SAG/AFTRA, Commercial Strike 2000 Web-
site, at http://www.sag.org/strike; cf. AAAA, Strike Website, at http://www.aaaa.org.
Interestingly, during the recent strike, the 4A's website was hacked into, presuma-
bly by members of SAG, because SAG propaganda was posted to the 4A's website
during the strike. SAG/AFTRA later posted a notice to its members not to engage
in similar tactics. See American Association of Advertising Agencies, at http://ww-
waaaa.org/dowloads/negotiationsOO/strike/status7-24.html ("We are also distressed that
on Wednesday of last week the AAAA website was hacked into and SAG propa-
ganda from the SAG website was posted for viewing. AAAA strike-related matter
was altered. This is a very serious violation of federal law.").
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The Internet will likely continue to play an important role in
future collective bargaining as the parties deal with outstanding is-
sues such as the monitoring of residuals and the payment formulas
for commercials made exclusively for Internet usage. Web develop-
ers have no difficulty installing "webtickers" on websites that make
it easy to track the number of visitors to a particular website. From
a technological standpoint, therefore, the Internet may be the me-
dium most amenable to systematic tracking of residual payments
based on viewership of on-line commercials. 68 Moreover, as SAG's
Gordon Drake has pointed out, the convergence of television and
the Internet may "aid monitoring [of] cable" as a result of certain
technology embedded within typical broadband cable boxes. 69 In
any event, given the importance of the Internet to the future eco-
nomic welfare of the advertising industry, the JPC and SAG/AFTRA
would be well-advised to examine the Internet's potential as a tool
for resolving the residual-monitoring issue.
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE SAG/AFTRA STRIKE, TECHNOLOGY AND
COLLECTWVE BARGAINING
From the experience of the 2000 SAG/AFTRA strike, we can
draw three related conclusions about the nature of technological
change and collective bargaining in the entertainment industry.
First, collective bargaining strategy appears to be motivated in
large part by current (often incomplete or incorrect) views about
the nature of future technological trends in the industry. Both
SAG/AFTRA and the JPC entered into negotiations armed with
their own "forecasts" on where technology will lead the industry
and how it will effect their pocket-books. SAG/AFTRA seems to
have commenced negotiations with an almost religious belief in the
centrality of the Internet to their future viability. As a result, SAG/
AFTRA made compromises to obtain a foothold in the Internet
world. It is fascinating to note that critical strategic decisions - for
example, SAG/AFTRA's decision to accept a flat-rate fee for "move-
over" commercials - were apparently made on nothing more than
logical guesses about the future significance of Internet advertising.
68. It remains to be seen which revenue model will be appropriate for on-line
commercials. For a useful summary of the relevant possibilities, including per use
content, per page view, flat fee, revenue share, barter and other models. See
Rasenberger & Ford, supra note 43 at S20. The television model - commercials
spliced into online video content - as the "price" of a download may prove to be
the most viable method of revenue generation.
69. See Armbrust, supra note 12.
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Second, the collective bargaining process may be effected by
institutional memories of past failures to capitalize on new technol-
ogy, even though bargaining strategy-by-analogy may be imprecise
at best. Here, SAG/AFTRA clearly did not want to miss the In-
ternet boat in the same way that they arguably erred with respect to
cable residuals. As SAG/AFTRA's prior experience with cable dem-
onstrates, collective bargaining in the absence of a thorough under-
standing of the nature of technological change may force a party
onto a negotiating treadmill where it has to run fast just to stay in
the same place.
Finally, it is likely that the amazingly rapid pace of technologi-
cal change itself will pose general difficulties to all collective bar-
gaining processes in the entertainment and advertising industries
by forcing parties to negotiate "in the dark." The lack of vital infor-
mation can lead to negotiating break-downs as neither side can af-
ford to make strategic compromises without risking large-scale
errors. In this case, both SAG and AFTRA have attempted to get
ahead of the Internet curve, but the positions to which they ulti-
mately acceded in the 2000 strike settlement presuppose a certain
movement of the advertising industry to commercials made exclu-
sively for the Internet. If on-line commercials in the future all sim-
ply migrate from television to the Internet, SAG/AFTRA will have
made the exact same mistake that they previously made with cable -
that is, they will have allowed the advertisers to pay residuals pursu-
ant to a flat fee regime for the majority of the commercials running
in the new media.
These tentative conclusions suggest that it may be worthwhile
for entertainment unions to invest in sophisticated technological
analyses of the state of the industry prior to commencement of fu-
ture negotiations on existing collective bargaining agreements.
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